CrossFit v. Alvies by United States District Court for the Northern District of California
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Plaintiff CrossFit, Inc. ("CrossFit") brings this action 
against Defendant Jenni Alvies ("Alvies") for trademark 
infringement, among other things.  ECF No. 1 ("Compl.").  Alvies 
has counterclaimed for (1) declaratory judgment; (2) violation of 
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code. § 17200, et seq.; and (3) false advertising under the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125.  ECF No. 16 (First Amended Counterclaims 
("FACC")).  CrossFit now moves to dismiss Alvies's counterclaims 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  ECF No. 24 
("MTD").  The motion is fully briefed, ECF Nos. 26 ("Opp'n"), 30 
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("Reply"), and appropriate for determination without oral argument 
per Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).  For the reasons set forth below, the 
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 As it must on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court 
treats all well-pleaded allegations in the FACC as true.1  CrossFit 
has developed a fitness training regimen and provides a nationally 
standardized certificate program to personal trainers who desire to 
become licensed CrossFit affiliates.  Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11.  CrossFit 
owns several registered United States trademarks and service marks 
comprised of the word mark CROSSFIT, including a service mark for 
use in connection with fitness training services.  Compl. ¶ 10, 
FACC ¶ 23.  CrossFit has also filed trademark applications with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") for other uses of 
the CROSSFIT mark on an "intent-to-use" basis, meaning that 
CrossFit has yet to use the mark in commerce in connection with 
those uses.  FACC ¶ 24.  The applications relate to nutritional 
energy bars, computer software that tracks workouts, weight-loss 
equipment, magazines, books, and sports bags.  Id. ¶¶ 25-28. 
 In April 2011, Alvies, a stay-at-home mother of four children, 
launched a blog at "crossfitmamas.blogspot.com."  FACC ¶ 21.  
Around the same time, Alvies created a "CrossFit Mamas" Facebook 
page.  Id. ¶ 48, Compl. ¶ 13.  Alvies used the blog to post daily 
high-intensity interval training routines.  Id. ¶¶ 20-21.  Readers 
                                                 
1 For background, the Court also refers to a number of allegations 
from CrossFit's complaint.  However, for the purposes of 
adjudicating the instant motion, the Court only considers Alvies's 
allegations. 
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of the blog use the comments section to post and track their 
personal progress on certain exercises.  Id. ¶ 21.  In an effort to 
recoup some money for her efforts, Alvies sold vitamin meal-
replacement shakes through the blog and added Google AdWords 
advertising.  Id. ¶ 22.   
 On May 9, 2013, a paralegal from CrossFit contacted Alvies and 
demanded that Alvies stop using the CrossFit name on her blog and 
affiliated Facebook page.  Id. ¶ 48.  CrossFit's paralegal also 
began communicating with at least one reader of Alvies's blog about 
the quality of Alvies's workouts.  Id. ¶ 52.  The paralegal stated 
that she had "assessed a few days of [Alvies's] workouts" and 
determined it was "bad programming."  Id.  The paralegal also 
represented that a CrossFit trainer determined that Alvies's 
workouts were "stupid and unsafe."  Id. 
 CrossFit also requested that third parties remove Alvies's 
Blog and sent a takedown notice to Facebook pursuant to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").  Id. ¶ 55.  Alvies allegedly 
reached an agreement with CrossFit's paralegal whereby she would 
move her blog to the domains "califitmamas.com" and 
"califitmamas.blogspot.com."  Id. ¶ 49.  The paralegal allegedly 
asserted that Alvies could not use the term "CFMamas" because "CF" 
is a common abbreviation of CrossFit.  See id. ¶ 51.   
 Thereafter, CrossFit continued to demand that Alvies disable 
her Google AdWords and cease selling the vitamin shakes.  CrossFit 
also allegedly reneged on the deal struck by its paralegal, 
demanding that Alvies cease using the domain "califitmamas.com."  
Alvies subsequently moved her blog to "hiitmamas.blogspot.com."  
After the second move, CrossFit repeatedly demanded that Alvies 
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delete over two years of blog posts.  Alvies alleges that 
CrossFit's demands constitute "an improper effort to eradicate all 
Internet evidence of Alvies's prior use in commerce of marks 
subject to the Intent-to-Use Applications regarding nutritional 
shakes, computer software to track workouts, and others."  Id. ¶ 
64. 
 In August 2013, CrossFit filed the instant action against 
Alvies in federal court, asserting causes of action for trademark 
infringement, false designation of origin, trademark dilution, and 
cyberpiracy.  Alvies counterclaims for (1) declaratory judgment, 
(2) violation of the UCL, and (3) false advertising under the 
Lanham Act.  CrossFit now moves to dismiss all three counterclaims. 
 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
   A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim."  Navarro v. 
Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).  "Dismissal can be based 
on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory."  
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 
1988).  "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).  However, "the tenet that a court 
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 
is inapplicable to legal conclusions.  Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice."  Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).   
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 A. Declaratory Relief 
 Alvies seeks declaratory judgment on a number of grounds.  
CrossFit moves to dismiss with respect to only one aspect of 
Alvies's counterclaim.  Specifically, CrossFit targets Alvies's 
claim that CrossFit violated 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) by making material 
misrepresentations in the DMCA takedown notice it submitted to 
Facebook.  MTD at 6-8.  The DMCA targets the circumvention of 
digital walls guarding copyrighted material, but does not provide 
remedies for trademark infringement.  See 17 U.S.C. § 502.  Alvies 
asserts that CrossFit's invocation of the DMCA was improper and 
misleading since CrossFit's claims are based on the assertion of 
trademark rights, not copyrights.  FACC ¶ 72.  Under the DMCA, 
specifically 17 U.S.C. 512(f), any person who knowingly materially 
misrepresents that material infringes on a copyright shall be 
liable for damages incurred by the alleged infringer. 
 CrossFit argues that Alvies's claim is implausible because 
Facebook allows trademark takedown notices as well as DMCA 
copyright takedown notices.  MTD at 7.  This argument lacks merit.  
As an initial matter, it is unclear why the Court should take 
judicial notice of Facebook's internal compliance procedures.  This 
is simply not a fact that "is generally known within the trial 
court's jurisdiction," or that "can be accurately and readily 
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned."  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), (2).  Even if judicial 
notice were appropriate, Alvies has plausibly alleged that CrossFit 
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materially misrepresented that Alvies's Facebook page infringed on 
a copyright, since CrossFit's claims are based only on its asserted 
trademark rights.  Whether CrossFit may have been able to convince 
Facebook to remove Alvies's page on some other ground has no 
bearing on CrossFit's compliance with the DMCA.   
 CrossFit also contends that Alvies's claim fails because she 
was not injured by the DMCA takedown notice.  MTD at 7.  CrossFit 
argues that if it had not submitted a DMCA takedown notice, it 
could have submitted a trademark takedown notice that would have 
had the same effect.  Id.  Essentially, CrossFit is asking the 
Court to find that (1) Alvies's Facebook page infringed on 
CrossFit's trademarks, and (2) had CrossFit submitted a trademark 
takedown notice, Facebook would have removed Alvies's page.  This 
is asking too much.  The Court cannot adjudicate CrossFit's 
trademark claims on a motion to dismiss Alvies's counterclaim, let 
alone hypothesize about what Facebook would or would not have done 
if it had received a trademark takedown notice regarding Alvies's 
Facebook page.  The Court limits its analysis to the allegations in 
Alvies's pleading.  Those allegations indicate that Alvies derived 
at least some income from her blog and that the blog was associated 
with the Facebook page that CrossFit caused to be removed through 
an improper DMCA takedown notice. 
 Alvies's counterclaim for declaratory relief remains 
undisturbed. 
 B. UCL 
 Alvies's UCL claim is premised on the theory that CrossFit has 
engaged in harassing conduct in an effort to eradicate all evidence 
of Alvies's prior use of marks that are subject to CrossFit's 
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intent-to-use applications with the PTO.  FACC ¶ 75.  The UCL 
counterclaim targets CrossFit's efforts to delete Alvies's blog and 
Facebook page and to stop Alvies from selling vitamin shakes.  Id.  
The UCL prohibits any business act or practice that is unlawful, 
unfair, or fraudulent.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.  Alvies 
asserts claims under all three prongs.  FACC ¶¶ 76-78.   
 CrossFit argues that Alvies lacks standing because she has 
failed to plead an economic injury.  Mot. at 8-9.  The Court 
disagrees.  Alvies alleges that her blog and affiliated Facebook 
page generated at least a modicum of revenue through the sale of 
vitamin shakes and Google AdWords, and that CrossFit wrongfully 
caused those pages to be removed.  Thus, it is plausible that 
CrossFit's alleged misconduct resulted in economic injury to 
Alvies.   
 However, a private plaintiff's remedies under the UCL "are 
generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution."  Cel-Tech 
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 
179 (Cal. 1999).  Alvies's prayer for relief is vague with respect 
to the UCL.  She merely asks that the Court enter judgment that 
CrossFit violated the statute.  FACC p. 17.  There is no indication 
that Alvies is seeking injunctive relief.  Moreover, under the UCL, 
a plaintiff cannot recover restitution unless that plaintiff had an 
"ownership interest in the money or property sought to be 
recovered" and the defendant "acquired the plaintiff's money or 
property by means of . . . unfair competition."  Shersher v. Super. 
Ct., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Here, it is unclear how CrossFit could have 
acquired the lost revenue alleged by Plaintiff. 
Case3:13-cv-03771-SC   Document33   Filed01/22/14   Page7 of 11
 8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Alvies's UCL claim with leave 
to amend. 
 C. False Advertising under the Lanham Act 
 The Lanham Act prohibits "false representations in the 
advertising and sale of goods and services.  Jack Russell Terrier 
Network of N. Ca. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1036 
(9th Cir. 2005).  To prevail on a false advertising claim under the 
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, "a false statement 
of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its 
own or another's product."  Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 
108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997).  The injury alleged must be 
"competitive or harmful to the plaintiff's ability to compete with 
the defendant."  Jack Russell, 407 F.3d at 1027 (quotations 
omitted). 
 Alvies claims that CrossFit violated the Lanham Act by making 
false and misleading representations to readers of her blog 
regarding her workout regimens.  FACC ¶ 83.  Specifically, Alvies 
targets the CrossFit paralegal's representations to a blog reader 
that Alvies's workouts are "bad," "stupid," or "unsafe."  Id.  
Alvies further alleges that CrossFit's representations have 
irreparably injured her goodwill and reputation.  Id. ¶ 84.   
 CrossFit argues that Alvies lacks standing to assert a false 
advertising Lanham Act claim because the parties are not direct 
competitors.  MTD at 17.  CrossFit reasons that it is "one of the 
largest fitness training companies in the country," while Alvies is 
merely a "blogger who . . . sells Google AdWords and . . . vitamin 
shakes."  Id.  The argument lacks merit.  Both parties offer 
fitness training services.  See Compl. ¶ 9; FACC ¶ 18.  Their 
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business models differ, but they offer similar services to 
consumers.  That Alvies earns revenues through advertisements and 
vitamin shake sales rather than a nationally standardized 
certificate program does not mean that she does not compete with 
CrossFit.  Moreover, nothing in the Lanham Act suggests that 
differences in size preclude a finding of competition. 
 Next, CrossFit argues that Alvies fails to allege her Lanham 
Act counterclaim with sufficient particularity.  MTD at 18.  To the 
extent that CrossFit contends that Alvies's Lanham Act claim fails 
to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), its argument lacks 
merit.  Alvies has pleaded sufficient facts to put CrossFit on 
notice of the allegedly false statement that forms the basis of her 
Lanham Act claim.  Alvies's pleading identifies who made the 
statement, to whom the statement was made, the exact contents of 
the statement, why the statement is false, and the approximate time 
of the statement. 
 However, the Court agrees that Alvies has pleaded insufficient 
facts to establish that the conduct alleged constitutes advertising 
for the purposes of the Lanham Act.  Under the Act's false 
advertising provisions, statements are only actionable if they 
constitute "commercial advertising or promotion," which has been 
defined as "(1) commercial speech; (2) by a defendant who is in 
commercial competition with plaintiff; (3) for the purpose of 
influencing consumers to buy defendant's goods or services."  
Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 
725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers 
v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).  
"While the representations need not be made in a 'classic 
Case3:13-cv-03771-SC   Document33   Filed01/22/14   Page9 of 11
 10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
advertising campaign,' but may consist instead of more informal 
types of 'promotion,' the representations (4) must be disseminated 
sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute 
'advertising' or 'promotion' within that industry."  Id.   
"Representations that are commercial advertising or promotion under 
the Lanham Act must be part of an organized campaign to penetrate 
the market, rather than isolated disparaging statements."  eMove 
Inc. v. SMD Software Inc., CV-10-02052-PHX-JRG, 2012 WL 1379063, at 
*5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 Alvies's pleading targets a single, isolated email from a 
CrossFit paralegal to a reader of Alvies's blog.  This hardly 
constitutes "an organized campaign to penetrate the market."  See 
id.  Without more, the Court cannot conclude that Alvies's Lanham 
Act counterclaim concerns commercial advertising or promotion.  
Accordingly, the Lanham Act counterclaim is DISMISSED with leave to 
amend.  The amended pleading should identify CrossFit's allegedly 
disparaging statements and explain how they were disseminated to 
the purchasing public. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, CrossFit's motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  Alvies's counterclaim for 
declaratory relief remains undisturbed.  Her counterclaims for 
violations of the UCL and the Lanham Act are DISMISSED with leave 
to amend.  Alvies shall file an amended pleading within thirty (30) 
days of the signature date of this Order.  Failure to do so may 
result in dismissal with prejudice of her UCL and Lanham Act 
counterclaims. 
 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 January 22, 2014 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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